The Future of FM3-24

Carl Prine over at Line of Departure has a fantastic post on the future of FM3-24. There is very little I disagree with here. The debate over the future of FM3-24 is exceptional, and I for one, look forward to reading the new manual.

The Use of ‘Haboob’ Apparently Proves Muslim’s are Taking Over.

I have my problems with Think Progress and the Center for American Progress, but this is exactly what their blogging and sparring with the American right-wing should be about.

Key quote: “one Arizona resident said, “I am insulted that local TV news crews are now calling this kind of storm a haboob. [...] How do they think our soldiers feel coming back to Arizona and hearing some Middle Eastern term.”

Seriously! Someone actually said that!

As the post continues, “And if this is suddenly the guiding principle on acceptable vocabulary, Arizonans should eye words like algebra, pajamas, khaki, coffee, giraffe, lemon, orange, mattress, zero, and alcohol with suspicion.”

Who Shot American Strategy? [Updated]

Update: INSS has demanded this post be removed from their site. So this is the only place this piece will remain.

Counterinsurgency, according to Colonel Gian P. Gentile, has killed American strategy. By itself, this is not a statement to be taken lightly. ‘The Death of American Strategy’ by Gentile in the third issue of Infinity Journal is the latest salvo in Gentile’s increasing frustration with the population-centric variant of Counterinsurgency (COIN) and its use on the battlefield. Gentile complains that the classical notion of strategy has been weakened and then buried under the fetishization of COIN.  Such a critique might have some force and validity were it not entirely based on highly selective readings of policy, strategic theory and historical analysis.  Nevertheless, the question remains, is Gentile correct that the concept of strategy in American security policy has been utterly obliterated?

Strategy describes the deployment and use of armed forces for the purposes of achieving a given political objective. Strategy is a distinctive part of the Clausewitzian logic of war. Gentile states that COIN, which has now, as a term, become synonymous with the concept of population-centric COIN, has replaced strategy.  It is impossible to ignore the outstanding analysis available that discusses how operational doctrine has overwrought the concept of strategy in a variety of ways, but does the utilization of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan qualify as the destroyers of strategy? The answer is no.

The current model of population-centric COIN is viewed through the doctrine espoused in the U.S. Army’s FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  NATO’s Glossary of Terms defines doctrine as, “Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.” Doctrine is implemented in a battle space at the operational level of war; defined by NATO as “the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operation.” FM 3-24 is a doctrine that was used to plan campaigns specifically in Iraq and beyond to achieve the policy objectives of the war. COIN is not a strategy, and it never has been.

Gentile is correct that the core aim of the war in Afghanistan is to “disrupt, disable and eventually defeat al Qaeda.” He is correct that nation building does not appear in this sentence. In fact it appears in the very next sentence of the ‘The Way Forward in Afghanistan’ document. To disrupt, disable and eventually defeat Al-Qaeda, “we and our allies will surge our forces, targeting elements of the insurgency and securing key population centers, training Afghan forces, transferring responsibility to a capable Afghan partner, and increasing our partnership with Pakistanis who are facing the same threats.”

In his West Point speech on 01 December 2009, President Obama said that to meet this goal, “…we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.” This is the strategy, and Gentile would do well to read beyond the first sentence of a strategy document before commenting on it.

Regardless of this oversight, Gentile remains convinced his form of counterinsurgency is the undeniably correct one. “An insurgency can be defeated or at least suppressed by focusing on the killing of insurgents without the addition of an expeditionary army doing nation building.” There is nothing implicitly wrong with this suggestion, and it has many historical examples of its utility, most recently in Sri Lanka, but it cannot be claimed that ‘strategy’, itself, and as a concept, is dead simply because a different version of an operational concept is utilized. The fact a different operational doctrine was agreed upon in fact shows that strategy does still exist.

Bob Woodward’s Obama’s War best described the making of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan. Nothing within the hundreds of pages describing the tugging and pulling of different concepts, personalities and points of contention would suggest American strategy is dead. Though the President certainly does complain he feels as if he is being pushed into a population-centric COIN campaign, it does not suggest strategy is dead. (Obama’s Wars, p.258) The fact only 30,000 troops, not 85,000 as suggested for a fully resourced COIN operation, (Obama’s Wars, p. 273) were sent as the Surge meant he – the Commander in Chief – was placing limits on the mission. This reasoning was based on economic considerations, an unwillingness to engage in long-term nation building, Obama’s own domestic constituency and that of Congress. (Obama’s Wars, p. 251, 298) These facts suggest a very deep engagement with the idea of strategy and the discourse between means and ends.

Instead, Gentile’s argument should be seen as a churlish reaction to not getting the proverbial girl. The notion that strategy is dead because enemy-centric COIN was not operationalized is fallacious in its entirety. The option was noted many times, as were its failings. (Obama’s War, p. 25, 102, 106-107, 299) Though even the President expressed his exasperation with not being given multiple detailed options, this does not suggest anything beyond the agreement of senior leaders that a partially-resourced population-centric COIN campaign was the best option available to achieve the stated objectives. Alternatives were suggested and were dismissed.

Gentile continues his piece in the same seethingly ill-mannered and temperamental way, completely devoid of evidence. COIN is boldly described as the “new American Way of War”. Such a declaration suggests he is spending more time re-reading his own work than U.S. Government strategy documents that do not suggest, nor push anything of the sort.

The utility of ‘The Surge’ is considered a myth because it did not achieve decisive strategic victory; something it was never intended to do. Vietnam-era General Creighton Abrams is noted towards the end with no referential material exhibited to describe why he is being derided for being supposedly called a “saviour” general. The operation underway in Libya is similarly thrown into the mix without an appropriate explanation.

But the strangest and most specious ‘proof’ used that COIN is destroying strategy is that “American Generals and politicians speak in the language of counterinsurgency tactics.” Such an argument is stunning in its irrelevance. It is akin to suggesting blitzkrieg has destroyed strategy because General Patton complained about not having enough fuel. The description of tactical actions is a rhetorical tool used to describe how victory will be obtained through the sequencing of those very tactical actions to achieve the necessary objectives, not that it is THE strategy.

Population-centric COIN has not destroyed strategy. Gentile’s argument in favour of that thesis is specious, petulant and entirely without evidence. COIN is an operational doctrine, and is useful in ensuring a better understanding of strategy. As David Ucko said in his paper, Counterinsurgency and its Discontents, “Counterinsurgency offers a collection of insights and guidelines collected from past operations, which, if used and adapted in a manner sensitive to local context, can help in the design and execution of a specific campaign plan.” It is not a strategy, nor has it destroyed that very concept.

As noted in Obama’s War, a modest population-centric COIN proposal was the most favored campaign design, and was planned for accordingly, but it was not the only option ever put on the table. Versions of Gentile’s preferred enemy-centric COIN plan were offered and eventually dismissed because they could not achieve the stated aims under the specific context of the Afghanistan war. Regardless of this fact, Ucko’s paper makes a far greater argument as to why population-centric COIN has not destroyed strategy: “[COIN] was a much-needed antithesis to a thesis [conventional warfare and counter-terror operations] that had not withstood its encounter with practice.”

I’m glad I’m not the only one…

Spencer Ackerman has the best headline today on William Owen’s new piece on Small Wars Journal: “Please, God, No More Stupid Anti-Counterinsurgency Arguments.”

It’s so nice to see someone else who is sick and tired of these crappy, weak and ill-tempered straw-man arguments. Jason Fritz’s comment below is good as well, but I don’t think Ackerman is suggesting what Fritz is accusing him of. Fritz, of Ink Spots fame, is one of the best bloggers out there, but I would dare to suggest Ackerman is not denying death, destruction and killing occurs in COIN, or that it is clean, but merely that is a certain style of warfare to be utilized when in certain circumstances.

Making Russia Happy

And another post from the INSS blog.

Raising Russia’s National Happiness

War. According to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, that is the best way to increase Russia’s national happiness. In August 2008, Russia and Georgia fought over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflict ended with Russia recognizing the independence of the two breakaway regions after pushing Georgian troops back into Georgia-proper. The situation has remained stable, but tense ever since. Both states are fighting internal problems, and neither can really afford to initiate hostilities again knowing both have much to lose. Nevertheless, President Medvedev declared during a press conference on 18 May 2011 that the 2008 conflict “was very important for the country…for making it feel strong.” Thus, if war against a tiny, weak state helps Russia to recover its sense of lost status, is it the harbinger of future conflicts?

The conflict began officially during the night of 07-08 August 2008 after Georgia launched a military offensive into South Ossetia. Georgia claimed it was responding to attacks on its soldiers and native Georgians within the territory. Russia responded by launching its own offensive into both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian troops came within only a few kilometers of entering the Georgian capital, Tibilsi as the Georgian military crumbled. On 12 August, President Medvedev declared he had ordered the end to all military operations. Two weeks later on 26 August, Russia officially recognized the independence of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. Only Belarus, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru have recognized both states along with Russia, while Vanuatu recently recognized Abkhazia only, though clarification on this has been difficult.

Since the recognition, Russian security forces have remained in the two ‘countries.’ Russian soldiers patrol the administrative borders on land and sea, and maintain precision weapons systems on ready alert. Because of the number and type of troops in both regions has led US Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) to define that presence as an occupation. Though her use of this term is primarily because of her pro-Georgian stance, it does provide an apt description of the Russian presence as neither state can stand by, nor protect itself.

The 2008 conflict is the first real successful use of Russian military power since the end of the Cold War. The decimation of the Soviet-era military machine holds much of the blame for this, as does the weakness of Russia’s political system. The Russian intervention in the Georgian civil war era after independence achieved little. The First Chechen War of 1994-1996 ended in an ignominious Russian retreat. The Second Chechen War that began in 1999 was only ‘successful’ after the puppet leader Ramzan Kadyrov used his fathers name to take the Presidency and rule at the behest of Russia. Even then, the insurgency in the North Caucasus is not based entirely in Chechnya. Dagestan and Ingushetia suffer daily attacks as well. The insurgency has penetrated so deeply into Kabardino-Balkaria, that political and military parity between the security services and the militants has likely been achieved. All this has occurred as Russian troop presence has increased in the lead up to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.

Strategically, Russia is doing just as poorly. Russia’s ally, Serbia, was forced to relinquish control of Kosovo to NATO peacekeepers in 1999, which led to its declaration of sovereignty in early 2008. The Baltic states joined NATO. Ukraine threw out its pro-Russian leader in the Orange Revolution, and even though the pro-Russia Viktor Yanukovych is currently President, a strong pro-EU, pro-NATO section still remains in the body politic. China is gaining influence in Central Asia as its GDP grows ever larger, and as its political weight is used effectively through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Moreover, in an ironic twist of fate, as Russia and its leaders intend to promote the image of a strong Russia, to Western publics, the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Medvedev are treated more as Internet memes or sources of humor. Putin is looked upon as the real-life version of a Bond villain. In turn, Medvedev is seen as Putin’s ‘Mini Me.’ Video of either man dancing or singing makes greater headlines than a statement on the operation currently underway in Libya.

Chris Hedges says that “war is a force that gives us meaning.” His book by the same name stated that “even with its destruction and carnage [war] can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living.” Continuing on, Hedges notes that Manichean view created in battle: “[w]ar makes the world understandable, a black and white tableau of them and us.” Medvedev’s comments certainly correspond to Hedges’ analysis.

The establishment of meaning and the effective use of military force is likely why Medvedev claimed the 2008 conflict “made the country feel strong.” It was the first time Russia had really defeated an enemy and forced its policy preferences on anyone since the end of the Cold War. The conflict also intended to show how far Russia was willing to go to protect its interests. A message that was clearly aimed at NATO and its expansion plans. This war gave Russia the ability to prove it was a Great Power once again.

It must also be acknowledged that this feeling is not unique to Russia. In the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, the same feelings were expressed within the United States. On 02 March, 1991, US President George H.W. Bush declared that “we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” The statement was an affirmation in support of renewed US engagement with the world. The comment was made to show that the ‘Ghost of Vietnam’ had been exercised for good, and that military force can be used effectively in support of US interests, and above all else, its values. In other words, the Gulf War, as declared by the sitting president, made the country feel good about itself once again.

Medvedev’s comments were not unique, nor surprising. Examples exist across generations of leaders making similar statements. War has always provided meaning to society. As the 2008 Georgian conflict was the first key victory against an ally of NATO and the US, a certain degree of pride would naturally be felt within Russia. What these comments offer is an insight into the nature of Russian foreign policy thinking at the current time. As the comments were made at a press conference, it also suggests that Medvedev wanted the international community to be plainly aware of Russia’s new sense of self. Therefore, if Russia does feel stronger and better about itself, and is already willing to use military power to ensure the security of its interests as well as regain the title of Great Power, it should not be surprising that they will engage in more military operations into the future to achieve that status once again.

Review of Drezner’s International Politics and Zombies

My new position at INSS offers me a few added bonuses. Here is my first post at their blog. Reposted in full. And then there is this.

Daniel W. Drezner, Theories of International Politics and Zombies, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ), 2011

Dan Drezner’s Theories of International Politics and Zombies is the latest example of the increasing fascination with zombies within the pop-culture arena. It is the first book to address the issue in a formal theoretical sense however. The genesis for the book began with a blog post on Drezner’s Foreign Policy blog in 2009. Drezner was one of the first academics and public intellectuals to enter the blogosphere, and since then his site has become one of the staples of the foreign affairs arena. As Professor in International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Drezner commands a certain expectation with his work. Nevertheless, while the book is enjoyable and a quick read, I was left with a single question in my mind after finishing it: why did I pay $15.00 for this?

Drezner begins by describing exactly why he decided to write the book. Simply, “the international relations community needs to digest the problem posed by flesh-eating ghouls in a more urgent manner.” The zombie apocalypse preparedness guidefrom the U.S. Center for Disease Control would suggest Drezner is not alone in this concern.

From this, a description of the various forms of zombies is provided – an essentially contested idea apparently – and a definition emerges: a “biologically definable, animated being occupying a human host, with a desire to eat human flesh.” The definition is referenced from the Zombie Research Society. (Yes, it actually exists.)

Drezner fully admits this book is part-prank, but it also serves as a platform to gain a greater understanding of international politics, and in particular, international relations theory. The fun side of the book comes from all the pop-culture references and evidence he uses come from books and movies. And obviously from the fact Zombies don’t actually exist – yet…. Videogames are mentioned, but as they are more activity driven than anything else, they struggle to provide the empirical analysis necessary.

The serious side resides in the notion that as cultural knowledge of zombies and zombie-related references increase so should the theory of the phenomena that surrounds it, and us. Regardless of the topic, certainly no policy wonk can argue against that reasoning.

The book traces through four specific international relations theories and how each of them would deal with a zombie apocalypse: Realpolitik; liberalism, of all varieties; Neoconservatism; and Constructivism. Max Brooks’ World War Z provides the core observations to these theories in action as the story narrates how the various states of the world deal with a zombie apocalypse originating in China. Other examples from the Resident Evil and 28 Days/Weeks franchises are repeatedly used as well.

The major problem with Drezner’s work is that the theoretical construct used is a basic caricature of the theories themselves. The descriptions of the theories are the bare-bones, un-nuanced versions. Even when variances are mentioned, they remain crudely drawn ones. Realism/Realpolitik will rely on the misinterpretations of Thucydides, and play Zombie and non-Zombie states off of one another. Liberalism would focus on creating an international consensus based on international law before acting. Neoconservatism is an insular, Manichean theory whose only purpose is to serve American interest. (Ok, that caricature is pretty close to reality.) While Constructivism would focus on preserving the social identity of zombies and might even embrace zombie “soft power.” International relations theory is a complex matrix of ideas, counter-ideas and historical examples, and any theorist would feel a little cheated by these parodies.

Nevertheless, Drezner makes excellent use of the literature to give the reader a swath of hilarious comments and one-liners. When Drezner wrote in a footnote as to why he left out Marxism and Feminism – “To Marxists, the undead symbolize the oppressed proletariat. Unless the zombies were all undead white males, feminists would likely welcome the posthuman smashing of existing patriarchal structures.” – I actually laughed out loud on the Metro, much to my embarrassment. Poking fun at Alexander Wendt’s famous quote, Drezner writes that, “Zombies are what humans make of them.” Robert Kagan is rewritten as “humans are from Earth, Zombies are from hell.” When Drezner notes that the use of nuclear weapons would be a catastrophic mistake because it would create a race of super-zombies, you cannot help but smile at the fact he actually spent time thinking about that.

For all the enjoyment the book offers, for the quick and easy read that it was, the book was underwhelming. It left me wondering why I spent $15 for it. That $15 could have been spent on another, more valuable and inherently more useful book. The theories were presented as basic caricatures of themselves. The lack of nuance makes the book read like an undergraduate essay. At an intellectual level I doubt many graduates would look back upon this as an example of strong scholarship.

But in the end, that’s who should purchase this book: Undergrads. It presents complex theories in a basic format, with references that are easily accessible and understandable to them. It will be far more useful than most international relations theory textbooks, initially at least. It is a quick primer that isn’t dry or boring. But that’s as far as this book should be used.

“…Abortions for some, miniature American flags for everyone else…”

Damn I love memebase…